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Abstract
Since the 1960s both regeneration and security have been prominent themes in Olympic planning. However, 
this paper argues that the prominence given to post event “legacies” in London’s bid to host the 2012 
Summer Games has fomented a merger of these hitherto distinct ambitions oriented around notions of “re-
silience”. In addition to identifying this merger, based on analysis of planning for the 2012 Games the paper 
sets out its component features and considers a range of key implications. These include the accommoda-
tion of Olympic security amid shifting national security arrangements and, at a local level, the impact and 
importance of the 2011 London riots on Olympic safety and security processes. Organised over four areas of 
discussion – the first three comprising of the coupling of spatial strategies of resilient planning and design 
with concerns for security; the temporal framework of such approaches; analysis of the altered physical and 
institutional landscape of London ahead of the 2012 Olympic Games – the paper concludes by identifying 
and discussing the ways in which urban rejuvenation and securitisation which are increasingly being com-
bined into resilient designs and master plans in the Olympic context and, crucially, standardised, exported 
and transferred to new urban hosts of similar events. 
Keywords: Mega-event. Security. Resilience. Urban change. 
Resumo
Desde a década de 1960, regeneração e segurança têm sido temas proeminentes no planejamento olímpico. 
Entretanto, este artigo argumenta que a evidência dada para o “legado” pós-evento na candidatura de Londres 
para os Jogos Olímpicos de 2012 proporcionou uma fusão dessas duas, até então, distintas ambições orientadas 
a partir de noções de “resiliência”. Além de identificar essa fusão, baseada na análise do planejamento para os 
jogos de 2012, o artigo descreve suas principais características e considera uma variedade de implicações-chave. 
Isso inclui a aceitação da segurança olímpica em função de mudanças de arranjos nacionais de segurança e, em 
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This paper undertakes an analysis of this con-
text, generally, of the parallel mega-event processes 
of urban regeneration and urban securitisation, 
specifically, and is organised over four broad areas 
of discussion. The first section will briefly high-
light how these dual regenerative and securitising 
processes have been coupled in spatial strategies 
of resilient planning and design, highlighting how 
Olympic-led redevelopment is being tempered, and 
in some cases fundamentally reconfigured, by con-
cerns for security. The second section combines this 
spatial perspective with a temporal framework, not-
ing how various urban space interventions are dif-
ferentially deployed before, during and after mega-
events have “left town”. To exemplify these sets of 
processes, the third section explores how the physi-
cal and institutional landscape of London is being 
indelibly altered in response to both the needs of 
regeneration and security associated with the 2012 
Olympic Games. In this section we highlight how 
the connections between security and regeneration 
are fluid, especially in the period immediately be-
fore the mega-event and have altered in response to 
changing dynamics of security threats and of civil 
disobedience (and associated policy changes), fiscal 
retrenchment, and the changing face of the security 
governance put in place for London 2012. The final 
section of the paper will reflect upon the London ex-
perience to date, and relate this to security prepa-
rations for other mega sporting event, notably the 
2014 Commonwealth Games in Glasgow and the 
subsequent 2016 summer Olympics being held in 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. In so doing we will seek to illu-
minate potential policy transference for mega-event 
organisers who are tasked with providing a tangi-
ble regeneration legacy in the face of a perceived 
Introduction
Since the Second World War a core part of the 
mega-event experience, and its legacy for the host 
city, has been the ability to stimulate large-scale 
redevelopment through transformational regenera-
tion schemes (COAFFEE, 2007; GOLD; GOLD, 2010). 
Within the context of the Summer Olympics such 
redevelopment is seen as a key rationale for cities 
to be awarded the Games by the International Olym-
pic Committee (IOC) with the event seen to offer an 
unparalleled shop window for inward investment 
and private sector land development (COAFFEE, 
2010a; ESSEX; CHALKLEY, 1998; OLDS, 1998; TUFTS, 
2001; BURBANK et al., 2001; SEARLE, 2002). Com-
bined with this regeneration rhetoric, safety and se-
curity, and the management of incivility, have become 
key leitmotifs of the Olympic experience and bid-
ding process (FUSSEY; COAFFEE, 2011; BENNETT; 
HAGGERTY, 2011). Often in Olympic history this 
search for safety has resulted in large scale and pu-
nitive policing methods being deployed and the evic-
tion or removal of “offending” groups or unwanted 
activities that do not fit with the planned – or con-
trived – vision for the Olympic city (FUSSEY et al., 
2011). Moreover, concerns for security, resulting 
from the fear of international terrorist attack at in-
ternational mega-events, such as the Olympics, and 
against the associated crowded places and critical 
infrastructure of the host city, has meant that prin-
ciples of resilience – from the Latin resilire, “to leap 
back” – are increasingly designed into the built envi-
ronment and embedded within the behaviours and 
practices of those responsible for construction and 
securing of the Olympic venues and sites (COAFFEE, 
2010b).
âmbito local, o impacto e a importância dos protestos de 2011 em Londres para a segurança olímpica e para 
processos de segurança. O artigo é organizado em quatro áreas de discussão. As três primeiras estão ligadas a 
estratégias espaciais de planejamento resiliente e design com preocupações de segurança; ao recorte temporal 
dessas abordagens; e à análise de ambientes físicos e institucionais modificados em Londres em circunstância 
dos Jogos Olímpicos de 2012. O trabalho conclui com a identificação e a discussão sobre os modos como o reju-
venescimento e a securitização urbana (que têm sido combinados cada vez mais com designs e planos direto-
res resilientes no contexto dos jogos, significativamente padronizados) têm sido exportados e transferidos para 
novas sedes urbanas de eventos semelhantes. 
Palavras-chave: Megaevento. Segurança. Resiliência. Transformação urbana. 
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created, often as a result of mega-event-led construc-
tion, are not “open” to all (COAFFEE, 2007) and that 
the aim of urban authorities is often to “spatially pu-
rify” (SIBLEY, 1995) such spaces for particular user 
demographics (ROGERS; COAFFEE, 2005).
In the case of mega-events, such as the summer 
Olympics, spectators, consumers, tourists and would-
be residents of the regenerated host neighbourhoods 
are the commonly targeted groups with other po-
tential users of space often excluded or ejected. For 
example, commentators have noted how, before the 
2000 Sydney Games, permitted activities in public 
spaces were restricted and a systematic “street 
sweeping” occurred in the host city, made possible 
by special legislation that gave the police “excep-
tional” powers to “move on” those who were causing 
“inconvenience” (SAUL, 2000, p. 35 apud FUSSEY et 
al., 2011). In more extreme cases related to Olympic-
led redevelopment, it has been reported that over a 
million people suffered forced evictions in relation to 
the urban redevelopment preceding the 1988 Seoul 
Olympics. Here it has been alleged that the Korean 
government ordered the demolition of slum hous-
ing visible from main roads and major hotels (Asian 
Coalition for HOUSING RIGHTS, 1989 apud LENSKYJ, 
2004). It has been argued that these practices have 
been repeated in subsequent host cities. Such initia-
tives range from the concealment of “undesirable” 
areas from the gaze of visitors (evinced in Atlanta, 
1996, and London, 2012 and, also the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup in South Africa) to, perhaps most nota-
bly, (government denied) reports of at least 300,000 
evictions in Beijing during the run-up to the 2008 
Games (ARCHAYA, 2005 apud COOK, 2007).
Techniques of security and resilient planning
Linked to the above discussion, in recent years 
concepts and practices of urban resilience have been 
increasingly utilised by planners and other built en-
vironment professionals in attempts to create safer 
places. It has been argued that resilience has become 
a core concern in professional planning and design 
practice as attempts have been made to make the 
built environment increasingly resistant to external 
risk from natural hazards, crime or from new se-
curity challenges orientated around the perceived 
threat of terrorism (COAFFEE; O’HARE, 2008). Such 
growth of security threats. We will also note how 
the widespread regeneration-linked securitization 
associated with London 2012 both reproduces and 
generates a number of precedents for future models 
of Olympic security and urban redevelopment.
Towards the resilient design of Olympic cities
The response of urban authorities to embed-
ding safety and security into Olympic-led regen-
eration projects is now increasingly being referred 
to through ideas of “resilience”. In this sense, resil-
ience is both physical and organisational. It encom-
passes both physical design initiatives and strategic 
spatial planning intervention, as well as a restruc-
turing of governance and management functions in 
response to an array of potentially disruptive chal-
lenges (COAFFEE, 2006). As such, a resilient built 
environment should be
designed, located, built, operated and maintained 
in a way that maximises the ability of built assets, 
associated support systems (physical and institu-
tional) and the people that reside or work within 
the built assets, to withstand, recover from, and 
mitigate for the impacts of extreme natural and 
human-induced hazards (DAINTY; BOSHER, 2008, 
p. 357).
Commonly, however, such urban resilience pro-
cesses, especially those associated with countering 
the terrorist threats that often foreshadow mega-
events, military security perspectives are bound up 
with neoliberal agendas connected directly to the re-
development of the city (ATKINSON; HELMS, 2007). 
Here the search for urban security and resilience 
exists within a climate of regional, national and 
global competition between cities for footloose capi-
tal, company relocation, cultural assets and visitors 
(COAFFEE; MURAKAMI WOOD, 2006), building on 
the existing processes of the competitive entrepre-
neurial city (inter alia HARVEY, 1989). Moreover, at 
the local level within the planning system, built envi-
ronment professionals are increasingly being made 
responsible for safety in public spaces through de-
sign intervention intended for crime prevention and 
the control of human behaviour (RACO, 2007, p. 50). 
This has led to accusation that the new urban spaces 
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people and vehicles across the urban terrain (LYON, 
2003; FUSSEY, 2007). Secondly, the increased popu-
larity of physical or symbolic notions of the bound-
ary and territorial closure which serve a defensive 
purpose, often through the erection of reinforced 
security barriers and bollards around “at risk” sites 
(BENTON-SHORT, 2007). Thirdly, the increasing so-
phistication and cost of security and contingency 
planning undertaken by organisations and different 
levels of government, intended to decrease their 
vulnerability to attack and increase preparedness in 
the event of an attack (COAFFEE, 2006) in addition 
to providing a number of reassuring and symbolic 
functions (BOYLE; HAGGERTY, 2009). Fourthly, the 
way that resilience has been embedded within the 
urban context through carefully crafted urban de-
sign interventions which focus upon the construc-
tion, remodelling and management of public spaces, 
taking into account issues such as public access, so-
cio-cultural preferences, the structural robustness of 
building materials and heritage concerns (NÉMETH; 
SCHMIDT, 2007).
Temporalities of the mega-event
Although the types of interventions mentioned 
above have obvious spatial and institutional imprints, 
where mega-events differ from other forms of secu-
rity or “target” risk is in the different temporalities 
that make up the “event”. In the case of Olympic se-
curity planning we can usefully distinguish between 
three interlinked stages where different activities 
occur and which serve to shape the built environ-
ment and its management in a myriad of connected 
ways. Initially we can discern the pre-event or pre-
planning stage. This involves technically scrutinis-
ing and designing-out weaknesses and vulnerabili-
ties well in advance of the event. Increasingly this is 
taking the form of permanent design alternation to 
the built fabric of the city. As the event draws ever 
nearer the intensity of such security preparations 
becomes more pronounced. Here the pre-existing 
security regime in the host city will mediate what is 
deemed necessary. During the event particular types 
of largely temporary security measures are deployed 
which commonly attempt to utilise what the po-
lice and security services refer to as “island secu-
rity” to physically “lockdown” key venues through 
processes have served to draw neo-liberal planning 
agendas and their attendant security-focused ambi-
tions towards the heart f new regeneration schemes. 
The on-going regeneration of central urban areas in 
many cities in the last decade and renewal schemes 
associated with mega-event-led upgrading, have giv-
en many opportunities to apply such resilient prac-
tices to the design and construction of new buildings 
and public spaces, facilitated by changes in building 
regulations and codes, and the planning system more 
broadly (COAFFEE; BOSHER, 2008). Indeed, mega-
events such as the Olympics, provide an unparalleled 
opportunity for a host city to redevelop previously 
under-utilised or disused land. However, such mega-
events, and the newly beautified spaces of associat-
ed developments, are also subject to the competing 
trend of being an increasingly attractive target for 
an array of local, national and international terrorist 
groups (RICHARDS; FUSSEY; SILKE, 2010).
Since the 1970s, and after the terrorist attacks at 
the 1972 Summer Olympics, security planning con-
siderations have become an integral and requisite 
part of bidding documents, processes and prepara-
tion for hosting such sporting mega-events. The cost 
and sophistication of undertaking such planning 
has advanced steeply in the last decade (COAFFEE, 
2007). Utilising recent work in urban resilience 
which has developed in the wake of 9/11 to focus on 
embedding the ability to “bounce back” into plan-
ning systems and emergency management proce-
dures, (COAFFEE; BOSHER, 2008) we can identify 
a number of separate interventions that have been, 
and continue to be, collectively used to enhance the 
safety, security, and ultimately the ability of cities, 
and their associated social, economic and institu-
tional systems to cope and respond in an event of a 
disaster or attack. These are measures that are only 
now beginning to be embedded within regeneration 
and urban development schemes associated with 
mega-events and transferred across time and place.
These urban security measures typically relate to 
technological, territorial, design and governance in-
terventions which have become prominent in policy 
debates as cities are increasingly scrutinised through 
the lens of “resilience”. We can categorize four such 
interventions:
Firstly, the growth of electronic surveillance with-
in public and semi-public urban spaces, in particular 
automated software-driven systems that can track 
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award the 2012 Games to London, was a reminder 
of the threat the Games would face from terrorist 
violence, and subsequently led to a massive increase 
in security budget and prompted Olympic organis-
ers to draw up ever more detailed contingency plans 
(COAFFEE, 2007).
In the pre-games phase of 2012 Olympic prepara-
tion a number of well-documented design interven-
tion have been observed which have wedded urban 
regeneration to concepts of security and resilience. 
These interventions are of different sizes and geo-
graphical effects ranging from designing protective 
security into individual venues to pan-London emer-
gency planning, thus reflecting the physical and or-
ganisational features of resilience outlined above. 
A specialist coalition of agencies – the Olympic Se-
curity Directorate – has developed detailed security 
plans based on actuarial and risk-based approaches 
in order to plan out prospective vulnerabilities as 
well as enhance the ability of emergency responders 
to cope in the event of a disruptive event, notably a 
terrorist attack. Key Olympic sites have been “sealed” 
with public access heavily restricted. The venues 
themselves, and their immediate surroundings, have 
been “protected” with an array of security features 
that have been designed-into the regenerating ur-
ban landscape. This is not only for the purposes of 
Games-time protection but linked to the desire for a 
security/safety legacy that follows¹. Here the entire 
Olympic park area – the site containing the major-
ity of the venues and Athletes village – is to be given 
“Secure by Design” (SBD)² status in the post-Games 
period. As the Association of Chief Police Officers 
noted on award the Olympic Park SBD status:
the award centres on the adoption of design and 
physical security measures that have been shown 
to reduce day-to-day crime, vandalism and anti-
social behaviour. Whilst the Olympic venues will 
have significant but discreet security for the pe-
riod of the Olympics, the application of the SBD 
project ensures that the general public, residents 
barrier methods of physical security, and the use of 
advanced surveillance equipment to screen specta-
tors and collect data from across the full-spectrum 
of the venue environment. After the event, there is 
also an increasing trend emerging regarding the 
post-event retention of security features, be they 
CCTV networks, or security conscious building de-
sign or cultures of policing and emergency response 
(FUSSEY et al., 2011). This three-fold phasing of se-
curity and resilience planning will be discussed in 
the next section in relation to the forthcoming 2012 
Olympics in London.
Planning a resilient London for 2012
In May 2003, announcing the UK’s intention to 
put London forward as a host for the 2012 Summer 
Olympics, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media 
and Sport pointed to the regenerative potential of 
the Games, noting that “the Olympics are not just the 
greatest show on earth. They will help to revitalise 
East London” (BBC, 2003). The decisive selling point 
of the London 2012 bid was the comprehensive plans 
for regenerating a large swathe of the capital hith-
erto afflicted by long-term derivation. Such plans re-
quired significant investment and land remediation. 
As the candidature file stated, “by staging the Games 
in this part of the city, the most enduring legacy of 
the Olympics will be the regeneration of an entire 
community for the direct benefit of everyone who 
lives there” (LONDON, 2004, p. 19).
Although London’s bid to host the 2012 Summer 
Games was strongly promoted as being about ur-
ban transformation, security concerns were also a 
central part of the application given London polic-
ing’s prior experience of dealing with a range of ur-
ban threats. In this sense specific Olympic security 
preparation would be grafted over pre-existing ex-
pertise at dealing with the threat of urban terrorism 
(FUSSEY et al., 2011). For London 2012, the July 7th 
2005 bombings, the day after the IOC’s decision to 
¹  As Sinclair (2011) notes, these security features, particularly the electrified fence that encircles the Olympic site, are conspicuously 
absent in the various computer-generated marketing images produced by London’s Olympic authorities.
²  SBD Secured by Design (SBD) began in the late 1980s and an award scheme, managed by the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) and supported by the Home Office, which aims to encourage developers to design space so as to minimise the crime op-
portunities which they present. 
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2011a, p. 7). This strategy drew off the latest revised 
UK National Security Strategy; A Strong Britain in an 
Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy 
published in October 2010 and was to be operation-
alised in line with the third iteration of the UK’s over-
arching counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST (HM 
GOVERNMENT, 2011, p. 105). The CONTEST strat-
egy itself specifically focused on the 2012 Games 
noting that the UK has guaranteed to the IOC that it 
will to “take all financial, planning and operational 
measures necessary to guarantee the safety and the 
peaceful celebration of the Games” (HOME OFFICE, 
2011a, p. 3). Specifically it highlighted a set of issues 
related to the threat and response to possible ter-
rorist attack:
terrorism poses the greatest security threat to the 
Games. Experience from previous Games and else-
where indicates that global sporting events provide 
an attractive and high-profile target for terrorist 
groups, particularly given the potential for mali-
cious activity to receive enormous international 
publicity. London 2012 will take place in an unprec-
edentedly high threat environment. Threat levels 
can change rapidly but by planning against a threat 
level of Severe we have maximised our flexibility to 
respond to a range of threats (HM GOVERNMENT, 
2011, p. 106).
Responses to these challenges are being devel-
oped through five workstreams, set out below, and 
contained within the 2012 section of CONTEST. The 
collective aim is to enhance the resilience of the 
Games through planning and design guidance (Pro-
tect) and related issue of governance, contingency 
planning and intelligence gathering:
 − protect Olympic and Paralympic venues, events 
and supporting transport infrastructure, and 
those attending and using them;
 − prepare for events that may significantly dis-
rupt the safety and security of the Games and 
ensure capabilities are in place to mitigate their 
impact;
 − identify and disrupt threats to the safety and 
security of the Games;
and retailers will enjoy the benefit of a prestigious 
and safe environment long after the Games have 
concluded³.
Here, counter-terrorism measures are applied to 
more prosaic offences in the post-event period. Over 
recent year’s a number of access and control zones 
have also been established in and around key ven-
ues, and London’s pre-existing Automated Number 
Plate Recognition CCTV systems have been adapted 
and expanded to meet the need of Olympic security 
organisers (COAFFEE et al., 2011). Moreover, and 
in relation to attempts to purify Olympic spaces, in 
advance of such overt securitisation the area sur-
rounding the Olympic Park was subject to the com-
pulsory purchase and then eviction of a number of 
social housing blocks and local businesses, “clearing 
them away in the first stage of a longer regeneration 
process” (RACO; TUNNEY, 2010, p. 14).
Olympic security and its links to the urban trans-
formation taking place in London has however been 
a fluid and uneven process but is becoming more 
intense as the 2012 Games draw near. At the time 
of writing (August 2011), with almost exactly a year 
until the opening Ceremony, the majority of the secu-
rity preparations (such as those noted above) have 
been undertaken or at least put in train. These plans 
are however undergoing final refinements with new 
security fears and counter-responses being factored 
into last-minute preparations. This temporal period 
is explored in more detail in the next section.
The immediate pre-event phase
The immediate security and resilience planning 
phase has begun in earnest in London with security 
preparation seen by many as the top priority in Games 
preparation. In March 2011 an updated Olympic and 
Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy (HOME OF-
FICE, 2011a, p. 7) was published which set out the key 
aims and objectives for the Police and Government, 
in delivering a safe and secure Olympic Games in just 
over a year’s time. The strategy’s overarching aim 
was “to deliver a safe and secure Games, in keeping 
with the Olympic culture and spirit” (HOME OFFICE, 
³  See <http://www.securedbydesign.com/news/viewstory.aspx?id=1449&url=http://www.securedbydesign.com/editable_pages/
SBD_1296560660316.html>. Access in: 22 jul. 2011.
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sports and entertainment stadia; cinemas and the-
atres; visitor attractions; major events; commer-
cial centres; the health sector; the education sec-
tor; and religious sites/places of worship (HOME 
OFFICE, 2009, p. 11).
As the Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan 
Police noted when talking about the “soft targets” 
that terrorists’ might seek out in 2012: “If you se-
cure the venues so the opposition [terrorist] can’t 
get in, they will look for a soft target like parallel 
events linked to the Olympics but with less security” 
(BBC, 2011). Such displacement of terrorist target-
ing has a long history and is arguably apparent in 
Eric Rudolph’s decision to attack a crowded com-
mercialised spectator zone rather than the Olympic 
stadium during the 1996 Atlanta Games.
Whereas traditionally, governmental, financial, 
critical infrastructure or military targets have been 
attacked, increasingly urban terrorism is targeted at 
everyday crowded urban spaces, which are by their 
very nature difficult to defend. Subsequently this 
has led to a wave of pre-emptive counter-terrorism 
interventions being rolled out across London in an at-
tempt to make such spaces more resilient (COAFFEE, 
2009a). Such mitigation measures that planners, ar-
chitects and other built environment professionals 
have been encouraged to integrate within new and 
existing buildings and public spaces, have largely 
been premised upon urban terror attacks that utilise 
vehicle-bourne explosive devices⁴. Such measures 
range from enhancing the robustness of materials 
used in construction or in the retrofitting of buildings, 
limited parking, the enhancement of electronic sur-
veillance capabilities, to the restriction on access to 
public spaces, particular those surrounding high pro-
file locations, through the use of crash-rated bollards.
However, the very migratory and innovative na-
ture of urban terrorism means that methods of attack 
change and migrate across international boundaries 
(CROFT; MOORE, 2010). Notably, recent commando-
style attacks against non-western cities – in Mumbai 
and Lahore in late 2008 and early 2009 respectively – 
and against soft, unprotected targets internationally, 
has led to a reassessment of western urban security 
strategies and an assumption that such terrorist modus 
operandi will migrate to western cities (COAFFEE, 
 − command, control, plan and resource the safe-
ty and security operation; and
 − engage with international and domestic part-
ners and communities, to enhance our securi-
ty and ensure the success of our strategy (HM 
GOVERNMENT, 2011, p. 107).
Given the high profile of the security operation, 
it was no surprise, therefore, that much interna-
tional press coverage to celebrate the one year 
countdown to the London Games was replete with 
stories highlighting the security infrastructure put, 
or being put, in place by Olympic managers and se-
curity experts. In a media story entitled “Security a 
top challenge in London in year before Olympics”, 
the Associated Press (2011b), highlighted both the 
regeneration and security legacies expected from 
the Games. Whist noting that “the Olympic park area 
was changing the face of a previously run down area 
of east London” and the iconic sporting venues be-
ing constructed, it also noted that “underpinning 
the sports festival will be one of the biggest security 
operation ever mounted” with security blanketing 
the English capital (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2011b).
Although much of the current security planning 
has focused upon enhancing the resilience of the 
Olympic venues, non-competition sites are also being 
closely monitored as the Games draw near. This con-
cern connects to on-going streams of government 
work in the fields of security and urban planning 
around the protection of “crowded places” deemed 
at risk from terrorist groups using innovative and 
novel methods. These targets of choice – crowded 
areas – have certain features in common, most no-
tably their easy accessibility that cannot be altered 
without radically changing citizens’ experience of 
such largely public places (COAFFEE, 2010b). In the 
UK, such crowded places are now defined by the 
Home Office as:
sites [which] are regarded as locations or environ-
ments to which members of the public have access 
that, on the basis of intelligence, credible threat or 
terrorist methodology, may be considered poten-
tially liable to terrorist attack by virtue of their 
crowd density [including] bars, pubs and night 
clubs; restaurants and hotels; shopping centres; 
⁴  Much work has also been carried out regarding threats from CBRN and cyber attacks (HM Government 2011).
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government, police and other agencies”. These exer-
cises are focused upon a range of possible disruptive 
scenarios but are being continuously tested to “make 
sure that they are going to operate in the way we an-
ticipate so that when it comes to Games time we’re 
ready and know what to expect” (HOME OFFICE, 
2011b). The Home Office had previously announced 
that they would run at least 10 simulation exercise in 
order to test security preparations and inter-agency 
working practices at selected venues (BBC, 2011). 
This follows on from extensive preparatory work 
undertaken since London was awarded the right to 
host the Games (in 2005) by the London Resilience 
Forum⁷ that was commissioned to scope the extent 
of Olympic resilience preparedness across agencies 
in London, and to co-ordinate pan-London resilience 
activity for the Games (COAFFEE, 2009a).
Learning from such contingency planning attains 
greater importance in the wake of Government cuts 
in Police funding which some felt might affect Games-
time operations which will see over 12,000 officers 
needed at peak times. The Home Secretary however 
noted that “I am confident we have the planning in 
place to deliver a safe and secure Olympics” (cited in 
THE DAILY MIRROR, 2011). In July 2011 there were 
also fears that security preparation would be thrown 
into chaos by the resignation of The Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner and Head of Olympic security 
for 2012, whose professional integrity was questioned 
in relation the News International phone hacking 
scandal (LONDON EVENING STANDARD, 2011). The 
Olympics’ Minister however argued that the strategic 
nature of the security plan already in place, drawing 
on an emerging international standardisation of me-
ga-sporting event practice (COAFFEE; FUSSEY, 2010), 
means that any potential social upheaval will not af-
fect overall security preparations.
Panic on the streets of London?
In early August 2011 there were further fears 
expressed about London’s policing capacity to cope 
2009b). Indeed a Mumbai-style attack will be one of 
the scenarios utilised in the security exercises be-
ing carried out by the Olympic security teams in the 
run up to the 2012 Games (GARDHAM, 2011; see 
also below). Such fears were confirmed by events in 
Norway in July 2011 in which over 70 people were 
killed by a lone gunman⁵. In an interview with the 
Associated Press, Jacque Rogge, the IOC president, 
reflected on the Norwegian events and noted that 
police intelligence, combined with the physical and 
managerial measures already in place will be crucial 
to providing a safe and secure Games for London:
it’s not just a fence and a wall and the armed pa-
trol [...] It’s much more than that. It’s intelligence 
[...] It’s not just the physical security of the athlete 
in the Olympic village [...] It’s not just sweeping a 
bus with mirrors under the floor. There’s also the 
surveillance on the Internet, and the collaboration 
between different agencies of different countries. 
There is a lot of intelligence going on (ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, 2011a).
The British Olympics Minister was also cited in 
the same article, noting that Olympic security prep-
arations were already making contingency for so-
called “lone wolves” but would re-examine its security 
plans: “Clearly where there are lessons to be learned 
from Norway we will learn them”. Moreover, he not-
ed that: “I am sure as you can possibly be one year 
out from the games that we have done everything 
that we need to deliver a safe and secure games” 
(ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2011a).
Security planning in the immediate pre-games 
period is therefore evolving to cope with both known 
threats and those security planners can only envi-
sion, but which are being role-played to enhance 
preparedness (LOS ANGELES TIMES, 2011). With 
one year to go before the Games began the UK Home 
Office⁶ released a statement on its website arguing 
that “we are confident that the right plans are in 
place to deliver a safe 2012 Games” and that “a pro-
gramme of security exercises are taking place to test 
⁵  This attack was combined with a vehicle bomb that exploded in the capital Oslo, killing a number of people and causing widespread 
damage to the cityscape.
⁶  The Home Office is the lead UK Government department for policies on counter-terrorism, immigration, policing, drugs and crime.
⁷  The Forum is the partnership body that oversees the work of London Resilience and comprises senior representatives from the 
main emergency organizations and key sectors.
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public disorder is one of those risks which we have 
already been planning against [...] obviously in light 
of the appalling events in London over recent days, 
we will review our planning to ensure that any les-
sons are identified (THE GUARDIAN, 2011).
As the Games draw near, increased importance is 
also being placed upon balancing the needs of safety 
with requirement of ensuring such securitisation does 
not get in the way of the sporting spectacle or “spirit” 
of the Games. The Associated Press (2011b) noted a 
renewed emphasis by organisers on ensuring secu-
rity is not overwhelming, citing the example of the 
Royal Wedding on April 29th 2011 in London as an ex-
ample of where a million people lined the procession 
route without any overly obtrusive security presence. 
As the organising committee leader, former Olympian 
Sebastian Coe noted, “We’re very good at policing in a 
discrete way […] the real challenge is to maintain se-
curity to protect athletes, protect people, protect as-
set, but at the same time having people leaving your 
city feeling they haven’t been pushed from pillar to 
post” (THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2011b).
Yet at the same time, it can be argued that hosting a 
Royal Wedding and an Olympic Games, although both 
constituting significant events, hold different polic-
ing and security demands. Most obvious here are the 
temporal differences between the events. In addition, 
despite aspirations (or public claims) for unobtrusive 
policing during Olympic and other sporting mega-
events, intensive and visible zero-tolerance style po-
licing strategies have been a common reality of these 
occasions. As Fussey et al. (2011) noted in advance of 
these latest riots, more intensive policing strategies 
have historically encountered significant resistance 
from the capital’s youth, most notably ahead of the 
Brixton (1981) and Tottenham, Broadwater Farm 
(1985) riots. Whilst considerable differences exist 
between the urban disorders of 1980s London and 
the events of 2011, there are significant issues at play. 
In the first instance, something that both the govern-
ment enquiries into the Brixton and Broadwater Farm 
riots of the 1980s (SCARMAN, 1981; GIFFORD, 1986, 
respectively) and the criminological literature on po-
licing (itself informed by Habermas’ (1976) concept 
of the “legitimation crisis”) share is an accent on the 
importance of the legitimacy of policing institutions 
and their representativeness of the communities they 
police. Not only are such relationships between the 
with the wide ranging security demands of hosting 
the 2012 Games. Following a spate of urban riots 
and civil disobedience in a number of London bor-
oughs – including the Olympic boroughs of Hackney 
and Waltham Forest – and the subsequent forced 
cancellation of high profile sporting fixtures (in-
cluding a England football international to be staged 
at Wembley) on police advice, those in charge of se-
curity planning for 2012 were forced to reflect upon 
how they would cope in the event of multiple secu-
rity breaches and how far this would,
stretch the police manpower on the streets. One 
leading local government expert was quoted as 
saying: “You can imagine how stretched the police 
would be if this were to occur during the Olympics 
[…] so I think this will create a worry within City 
Hall and the Home Office (GLOBE; MAIL, 2011).
The urban rioting engulfing London (and other 
areas of the UK) coincided with an IOC delegation 
visit to check on logistics ahead of the 2012 Games 
and a series of “test events” in some Olympic ven-
ues. In response the IOC noted that it was confident 
that the Games would be secure and that this was 
the responsibility of London authorities:
security at the Olympic Games is a top priority for 
the IOC. It is however directly handled by the lo-
cal authorities, as they know best what is appro-
priate and proportionate. We are confident that 
they will do a good job in this domain (THE DAILY 
TELEGRAPH, 2011).
Such sentiments demonstrate the international 
and domestic forces that impact on the staging of 
the Olympic Games. Nevertheless, the international 
community was however less optimistic. The Chi-
nese Government highlighted they had concerns 
about safety and security ahead of 2012 noting that 
in the wake of the riots: “The image of London has 
been severely damaged, leaving people sceptical 
and worried about the public security situation dur-
ing the London Olympics” (THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, 
2011). London officials also argued in response 
that were clear that such disorder would not im-
pinge upon 2012 security and that such disturbanc-
es had already been factored into their contingen-
cy planning:
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legacies are conceptual as well as physical. The in-
tended “permanence” of security infrastructure is 
readily being transferred to other “host” cities, indi-
cating a degree of policy learning and transfer. The 
aforementioned revised UK CONTEST strategy (HM 
GOVERNMENT, 2011) highlights explicitly how les-
sons from the 2012 security operation will be fed 
back into resilience planning for the 2014 Glasgow 
Commonwealth Games. Moreover, the UK’s Associa-
tion of Chief Police Officers (ACPO, 2011) has also 
highlighted how safety and security principles are 
being embedded within the ongoing regeneration 
and build standards underway in Glasgow:
for the overall success of the Games it is vital that 
security measures can be embedded throughout 
the entire process from design, through build, to 
delivery of the event itself and onto the legacy. 
Early awareness and consideration of security is-
sues and requirements will also contribute to the 
long term success and sustainability of the new 
communities created.
The intention of the Scottish Police Service is to 
afford Secured by Design accreditation to the Com-
monwealth Games Village, designed to accommo-
date 7,500 competitors and 1,500 officials. All ven-
ues and Games sites, be they existing structures or 
new builds, have been securitised for security risk 
and aligned where possible with designing-out crime 
standards (ACPO, 2011).
In relation the Olympics, Rio’s successful candida-
cy to host the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games 
also draws on these continuities of mega-event se-
curity. Although security practices are likely to be 
prioritised towards localised criminality rather than 
international terrorism (Rio, 2016, 2007), security is 
likely to be a major concern for Rio’s organising com-
mittee (COAFFEE; FUSSEY, 2010). These concerns 
can be more specifically related to the city’s murder 
rate (that annually stands at triple that of the entire 
UK), and fears of theft against tourists. Such issues are 
likely to elevate the attention afforded to security. To 
mitigate these risks a familiar plan is being formulat-
ed to that being developed in London building on the 
principles of perimeter security, technological sur-
veillance, Crime Prevention through Environmental 
Design (CPTED) principles and intensified policing 
strategies (Rio, 2016, 2007).
police and the capital’s youth particularly strained in 
the run up to the 2012 Games (which are hosted in 
neighbourhoods with some of the highest proportion 
of young people in the country), such tensions exists 
against a background of recession and austerity, fac-
tors long recognised as incendiary catalysts for urban 
disorder (inter alia BENYON; SOLOMOS, 1987). As 
Lord Scarman noted in his largely astute and report 
into the Brixon riots, intensive policing during such 
times “The police do not create social deprivation, 
though unimaginative, inflexible policing can make the 
tensions which deprivation engenders greatly worse” 
(SCARMAN, 1981, p. 157).
The ultimate is aim for “customer-sensitive” se-
curity to prevail which will provide the highest pos-
sible levels of security without having to “lock down” 
the entire city, as has happened at other Olympiads 
where sterile environments were created to facili-
tate enhanced security (COAFFEE et al., 2011). The 
Los Angeles Times (2011), for example, noted secu-
rity measures in Beijing which “discouraged public 
gathering and involved a force of more than 100,000 
creating an oppressive atmosphere”. By contrast they 
focus on the London 2012 official website which 
pledges to “build on the United Kingdom’s practice 
of discrete and effective security, while remaining 
in keeping with the sprit and culture of the Games” 
(THE LOS ANGELES TIMES 2011).
Planned legacy and policy transfer
The designing-in of counter-terrorism features to 
Olympic venues and other public spaces in the city 
requires knowledge of how built environment pro-
fessionals, alongside security specialists, can actively 
contribute the longer-term regeneration vision for 
the area. In the case of London, organisers have pro-
duced the most comprehensive plans seen for urban 
regeneration and security in modern Olympic history. 
The merging of these agendas in a host of permanent 
design and architectural features, and within systems 
for managing emergencies, has been widespread. In 
previous host Olympic cities such features have been 
largely temporary (COAFFEE; FUSSEY, 2010).
In its development of secure regeneration spaces, 
London’s built environment community is creating a 
planning “blueprint” for knowledge transfer across 
the globe for when mega-events come to town. Such 
urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana (Brazilian Journal of Urban Management), v. 3, n. 2, p. 165-177, jul./dez. 2011
Resilient planning for sporting mega-events 175
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by Design accredits the Commonwealth Games Village 
for 2014. 2011. Available at: <http://www.securedby 
design.com/news/viewstory.aspx?id=1445&url=http://
www.securedbydesign.com/editable_pages/SBD_ 
1290529722870.html>. Access in: 25 July 2011.
ATKINSON, R.; HELMS, G. (Ed.). Securing and urban re-
naissance: crime community and british urban policy. 
Bristol: Policy Press, 2007.
BBC. Blair backs Olympic bid. 2003. Available at: 
<http:// news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/other_sports/3029851.
stm>. Access in: 25 July 2011.
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london-14251906>. Access in: 26 July 2011.
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2011.
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and Planning D: Society and Space, v. 25, n. 3, p. 424-
446, 2007.
BENYON, J.; SOLOMOS, J. (Ed.). The Roots of Urban Un-
rest. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987.
BOYLE, P.; HAGGERTY, K. Spectacular security: mega-
events and the security complex. International Political 
Sociology, v. 3, n. 3, p. 257-274, 2009.
BURBANK, M. J.; ANDRANOVICH, G. D.; HEYING, C. H. Olym-
pic Dreams: the impact of mega-events on local politics. 
London Lynne: Reiner, 2001.
COAFFEE, J. From counter-terrorism to resilience, Euro-
pean Legacy. Journal of the International Society for 
the study of European Ideas (ISSEI), v. 11, n. 4, p. 389-
403, 2006.
COAFFEE, J. Urban Regeneration and the Olympic Experi-
ence. In: GOLD, J.; GOLD, R. M. (Ed.). Olympic cities: ur-
ban planning, city agendas and the World’s Games, 1896 
to the present. London: Routledge, 2007. p. 150-164.
COAFFEE, J. Terrorism, risk and the global city: to-
wards urban resilience. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009a.
COAFFEE, J. Protecting the Urban: the dangers of planning 
for terrorism. Theory, Culture & Society, v. 26, n. 7/8, 
p. 343-355, 2009b.
Such “solutions” couple required Olympic security 
standards with Rio’s tradition of delineating “high-
value” spaces from their urban context though crime 
prevention measures (COY, 2006) and reinforce the 
risk of further splintering of Rio’s divided landscape, 
providing a significant challenge to its regenerative 
aspirations. Indeed recent visits to Brazil by the UK 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, intended to allow 
the UK security industry “to pursue commercial op-
portunities and become the partner of choice for sport 
security” has reported that: Brazil sees a step change in 
the security situation in Rio as a legacy of the Olympic 
Games in 2016 in particular and is making progress 
on sustainable “pacification” of favelas (FCO, 2011).
Overall, the emerging blueprint for would-be host 
cities of sporting mega-events incorporates a strong 
element of both urban rejuvenation and securitisa-
tion which are increasingly being combined into re-
silient designs and master plans. Without a commit-
ment to such strategies individual cities and nations 
are unlikely to be given the opportunity to host such 
events in the future. The legacy of the coupling of re-
generation and security concerns within cities that 
have, or are about to host such events, is evident both 
as material and design changes within the built en-
vironment alongside greater surveillance and emer-
gency response capabilities. This is a trend that has 
been steadily growing since the wake of the terror-
ist attacks in Munich in 1972 through international 
networks which have been evolving a standardised 
approach to security, albeit one that is shaped locally 
to a great extent, and one which is likely to reach its 
zenith through the resilient planning put in place 
for London 2012 where security features are being 
made permanent and embedded seamlessly with ur-
ban regeneration plans.
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